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Case Comments
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be
a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmak-
ing process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President
is to execute. The first section of the first article says that "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States ... "71 [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, until the Crime Control Act is repealed or declared unconstitu-
tional, it must be followed by the federal courts, and should have been
followed by the Third Circuit in Zeiler.
William Edward Zeiler has been granted a new trial at which the eye-
witnesses in question shall not be permitted to identify him. The prose-
cution will be left with little evidence in a case in which eyewitness
identification testimony is of the greatest importance, and should have
been permitted under the mandate of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.72 The decision of the court to ignore this statute
seems unjustified, and one would expect at least some explanation.
The procedure used by the F.B.I. here was admittedly unwise, and in
other fact situations could certainly be a denial of an accused's constitu-
tional rights. Notwithstanding the seeming inadequacies of this decision,
however, the Zeiler holding is now the law of the Third Circuit, and it
remains to be seen what this court will do with future cases posing the
same issues.
MARCIA I. LAPPAS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE MAXIMUM WELFARE GRANT-The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that the State of Maryland
may, pursuant to its maximum grant regulation, limit the amount of
AFDC public assistance to large-member welfare families without viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.
Dandridge v. Williams, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970).
In conjunction with the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren program,' the State of Maryland adopted a "maximum grant"
71. Id. at 587-588.
72. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3502 (1969).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1964) which originated with the Social Security Act of 1935,
49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964).
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regulation which provided-for a ceiling on the amount of AFDC public
assistance available to any single family unit.2 Appellees, AFDC recip-
ients, brought suit to enjoin the application of the Maryland maximum
grant regulation on the ground that it was in conflict with the Social
Security Act of 1935 and with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. A three-judge district court held that the Mary-
land regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause.8 On appeal, how-
ever, the U. S. Supreme Court reversed, with Mr. Justice Stewart
authoring the majority opinion.
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A § 44A et. seq. (1969).
3. 297 F. Supp. 450 (D.C. M.D 1968): In its original opinion the District Court held
that the Maryland regulation was both in conflict with the federal statute and the Equal
Protection Clause. After reconsideration on motion the court issued a new opinion resting
its determination on the regulation's constitutional invalidity.
4. See generally Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
5. The following was the schedule for determining subsistence needs, exclusive of rent,
at the time this action was brought. Maryland Manual of Dept. of Pub. Welfare, Part II,
Rule 200, Sched. A, 27:
STANDARD FOR DETERMLINING COST OF SUBSISTENCE NEEDS
I II III IV V
Monthly costs when
Light and/ Heat with Heat, cook- Heat
No heat or or cooking or without ing fuel and all
Number of persons in utilities fuel in- light and water utilities
assistance unit (include included cluded included heating included
unborn child as an with with with included with
additional person) shelter shelter shelter with shelter shelter
1 person living:
Alone .................. $ 51.00 $ 49.00 $ 43.00 $ 40.00 $ 33.00
With 1 person .......... 42.00 41.00 38.00 36.00 35.00
With 2 persons .......... 38.00 37.00 35.00 34.00 33.00
With 3 or more persons 36.00 35.00 34.00 33.00 32.00
2 persons living:
Alone .................. 84.00 82.00 76.00 72.00 70.00
With 1 other person ..... 76.00 74.00 70.00 63.00 66.00
With 2 or more other
persons ............... 72.00 70.00 68.00 66.00 64.00
3 persons living:
Alone .................. 118.00 110.00 105.00 101.00 99.00
With 1 or more other
persons ............... 108.00 106.00 101.00 99.00 97.00
4 persons ................. 148.00 140.00 135.00 131.00 128.00
5 persons ................. 164.00 162.00 156.00 162.00 150.00
6 persons ................. 184.00 181.00 176.00 172.00 169.00
7 persons ................. 209.00 205.00 201.00 197.00 193.00
8 persons ................. 235.00 231.00 227.00 222.00 219.00
9 persons ................. 259.00 256.00 251.00 259.00 256.00
10 persons ................ 284.00 281.00 276.00 271.00 263.00
Each additional person over
10 persons .............. 24.50 24.50 24.50 24.50 24.50
Modification of standard for cost of eating in restaurant: Add $15 per individual.
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Under the AFDC program, the state computes the so-called standard
of need and the level of benefits of each eligible family unit within
its borders.4 The computation of this standard of need is based upon
the number of children in the family and attendant circumstances:
existing in the home itself. Generally, the standard of need increases
with the size of the family with increments becoming proportionately
smaller.5 The instant regulation works to set an upper limit of $250
per family per month in Baltimore City and $240 per family unit
elsewhere in the State.6
Plaintiffs urged the district court that the regulation operated to
discriminate between those families with large numbers of children
and those with fewer children in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Appellees also contended that the regulation was contrary to
§ 402(a)(10) of the Social Security Act of 1935 as amended.7
Mr. Justice Stewart spoke first to the urgings of the appellees in
regard to the statutory argument. Appellees cited the Court to language
in the Social Security Act which mandates Aid to Families with De-
6. The regulation now provides:
"B. Amount-The amount of the grant is the resulting amount of need when
resources are deducted from requirements as set forth in this Rule, subject to a.
maximum on each grant from each category:
"1. $250-for local departments under any 'Plan A' of Shelter Schedule
"2. $240-for local departments under any 'Plan B' of Shelter Schedule
"Except that:
"a. If the requirements of a child over 18 are included to enable him to complete
high school or training for employment (III-C-3), the grant may exceed the maximum
by the amount of such child's needs.
"b. If the resource of support is paid as a refund (VI-B-6), the grant may exceed
the maximum by an amount of such refund. This makes consistent the principle
that the amount from public assistance funds does not exceed the maximum.
"c. The maximum may be exceeded by the amount of an emergency grant for
items not included in a regular monthly grant. (VIII)
"d. The maximum may be exceeded up to the amount of a grant to a person in
one of the nursing homes specified in Schedule D, Section a.
"3. A grant is subject to any limitation established because of insufficient funds."
Maryland Manual of Dept. of Social Services, Rule 200, § X, B, at 23, formerly Md.
Manual of Dept. of Pub. Wel., Part II, Rule 200, § VII, 1, at 20.
In addition, AFDC recipients in Maryland may be eligible for certain assistance
in kind, including food stamps, public housing, and medical aid. See, e. g., 42 U.S.C.§ 1396 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. IV); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1695-1697. The applicable provisions
of state and federal law also permit recipients to keep part of their earnings from
outside jobs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-644 (1964 ed., Supp. IV); Md. Manual of Dept. of Social
Services, Part II, Rule 200, § VI, B(8)(c)(2). Both federal and state law require that
recipients seek work and take it if it is available. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F) (1964 ed.,
Supp. IV); Md. Manual of Dept. of Social Services, Rule 200, § III(D)(1)(d).
7. The Social Security Act provides that "all individuals wishing to make application
for aid to families with dependent children shall have the opportunity to do so, and that
aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness
to all eligible individuals." 64 Stat. 550 (1950), as amended, 76 Stat. 185 (1962), 81 Stat. 881
(1968), 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(10) (1964).
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pendent Children to all eligible individuals.8 (Emphasis added.) Ac-
cording to the appellees, younger as well as older siblings are defined
equally by the Act insofar as their dependency is concerned.9 There-
fore, the regulation in question operates to effectively deny federal
benefits to otherwise eligible later born children.10 Despite this appeal,
the majority found that all later born children were eligible for and
did in fact receive benefits under the regulation but that payment to
the family unit as a whole could not exceed the $250 statutory ceiling.
It was further submitted that the regulation contravenes the basic pur-
pose of federal law by encouraging the parents of large families to
"farm out" their "excess" children to relatives whose grants are not yet
subject to the maximum limitation."
The Court responded to the appellees' contentions citing King v.
Smith 12 for the proposition that the state possesses tantamount to
plenary power to determine both the level of benefits and standard of
need for its welfare recipients. After attempting to garner congressional
intent, Justice Stewart took the following position: [G]iven Maryland's
finite resources, its choice is either to support some families adequately
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) provides:
"The term 'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of
parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from home, or
physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother,
grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, step-
sister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew or niece in a place of residence maintained by
one or more of such relatives as his or their own home and (2) who is (A) under the
age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in
accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) a student regularly attending a
school college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical
training designed to fit him for gainful employment." The Act also covers children
who have been placed in foster homes pursuant to judicial order or because they are
State charges. 42 U.S.C. § 608.
10. Justice Douglas noted in his dissent that the $250 per month AFDC maximum
grant set by Maryland was completely divorced from and independent of the size and
actual need of the family unit. Thus, welfare benefits are denied to additional children
born into a family of six while the families' corresponding actual needs, which also in-
creased proportionately, went unmet. This situation must be compared to that of a six
or less member family who receives the full amount of their need as determined by the
Maryland Department of Social Sciences. Appellee Williams, according to the state com-
puted standard of need, should receive $296.15 per month for herself and her eight
children. Appellees Gary should receive $331.50 for themselves and their eight children.
Instead, these appellees receive the $250 maximum grant mandated by the regulation.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964). If Mrs. Williams were to place two of her children of
twelve years or older with relatives, each child so placed would be eligible for assistance
in the amount of $79 per month, and she and her six remaining children would still be
eligible to receive the maximum grant of $250. If Mr. and Mrs. Gary were to place two
of their children between the ages of six and twelve with relatives, each child so placed
would be eligible for assistance in the amount of $65 per month, and they and their six
remaining children would still be eligible to receive the maximum grant of $250. Note 55
at 433-4.
12. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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and others less adequately or not to give sufficient support to any
family. 13 He advocated the right of each state "to balance the stresses
which uniform insufficiency of payments would impose on all families
against the greater ability of large families to accommodate their needs
to diminished per capita payments."' 4
In rebuttal to the appellees' argument that the regulation effectively
encouraged parents to dissolve the harmony of the home and "farm
out" their children to relatives so as to receive their full share under
the federal grant, the Court, via Justice Stewart, replied that "the kin-
ship tie may be attenuated but it cannot be destroyed."' 5
Finding that the Maryland regulation practically resulted in some
quantum of aid being distributed to all eligible families and children,
the Court concluded that the mandate of the federal statute had been
met, and therefore, the statutory contention espoused by the appellees
was without merit.' 6
The Court next considered the virtues of the appellees' plea that the
Maryland maximum grant regulation was violative of rights guaranteed
13. Dandridge at 1159.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. The views enunciated by the majority did not go uncontested. Unimpressed by
the Court's reasoning, Justice Douglas also citing King v. Smith in his dissenting opinion,
vehemently maintained that the Maryland regulation created restrictions on the payment
of welfare benefits contrary to the avowed purpose of the Social Security Act. He indicated
that the thrust of the federal program was directed toward the social security of the
dependent child and not the well being of those who apply for aid on their behalf.
He reaffirmed the stand taken by the appellees that the maximum grant regulation served
as a powerful incentive to break up large families whose actual subsistence needs exceeded
the maximum grant.
Justice Marshall joined by Justice Brennan, wrote a separate dissent in which he
vociferously alleged that the Maryland regulation, by refusing payment to the fifth or
succeeding child in a family,* arbitrarily halted the support of certain dependent children
who otherwise met the standards of need which the state itself had established. He
called for payments to all eligible dependent children on an equal basis. With the aid
of pertinent legislative history," Marshall reasoned that the fostering of disunity in the
family sphere runs counter to the declared objective of the AFDC program, which is to
provide cash assistance for needy children "in their own homes."**
* Because of minor variations in the calculation of the subsistence needs of particular
families, and because the maximum grant varies between $240 and $250 per month,
depending upon the county in which a particular family resides, the cutoff point
between families which receive the full subsistence allowance and those which do not
is not precisely families of more than six members. In practice, it appears that the
subsistence needs of a family of six members are fully met. The needs of the seventh
member (i.e., the fifth of sixth child, depending upon whether one or both parents
are within the assistance unit), as defined by the State are met, if at all, only to a
very small extent. In the usual situation, no payments whatever would be made with
respect to any additional eligible dependent children.
* S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1935). Also see Social Security Act § 401.
S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1961).
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to them under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.17
Faced with the allegation that the regulation in question was invalid
on its face for "overreaching",18 the Court unequivocally stated that the
concept of overreaching was peculiar to the area of First Amendment
protections 9 and was therefore inapplicable to welfare law in toto.20
The Court made it manifestly clear notwithstanding its own admis-
sions as to the inequities involved in treating all eligible dependent
children on a first come-first served basis that:
In an area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'rea-
sonable basis' it does not offend the constitution simply because
the classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality.2'
The Court admitted that the administration of public welfare in-
volves the most basic needs of impoverished human beings, yet it
applied the same constitutional standard it had formerly reserved to
the state regulation of business and industry22-to be within the equal
protection of the laws, a state need only demonstrate a reasonable basis
for discriminatory classifications made by it pursuant to statute or
regulation.
Determined that the element of invidious discrimination was absent
from the Maryland maximum grant regulation,23 the Court adopted a
17. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-.
tection of the laws. (Emphasis added.) U.S. CoNsT'. Amend. XIV.
18. The District Court sided with the plaintiff-appellees holding the regulation invalid
on its face for overreaching. It violates the Equal Protection Clause "because it cuts too
broad a swath on an indiscriminatory basis as applied to the entire group of AFDC
eligibles to which it purports to apply." 297 F. Supp. at 468.
19. For a discussion of the concept of overreaching and the First Amendment see
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); see also U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
20. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968), where, by contrast, the Court found
state interference with the constitutionally protected freedom of interstate travel; see 8
DUQUESNE L. REv. 170 (1969-70).
.21. Dandridge at 1161, citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911).
22. For an exposure to cases in which the constitutional standard of equal protection
has been applied to the business setting, see Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., id.;
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948).
23. It is interesting to note that the contention was not made by the appellees that
the Maryland regulation was racially discriminatory in nature. Such a finding would ipso
facto make it inherently suspect. Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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laissez faire position with respect to the gamut of problems inherent in
the administration of public assistance programs; "[t]he Constitution
does not empower this [the Supreme] Court to second-guess state offi-
cials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited pub-
lic welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients."24
Justice Marshall, who dissented earlier with regard to the statutory
finding, fervidly renewed his attack on the majority's equal protection
analysis and rationale. He was quick to define the classifications created
by the regulation and found them to be fourfold: two consisting of
needy children and two of eligible families (those small families and
their members who receive payments to cover their subsistence needs
and those large families who do not).25 Implicit in these classifications
was the realization that similarly situated dependent children receive
wholly dissimilar treatment. Under the maximum grant regulation,
Maryland offers full subsistence benefits to some needy dependent
children while completely denying payment to others. Unable to digest
the Court's logic, Justice Marshall accurately observed that [i]n the
instant case, the only distinction between those children with respect
to whom assistance is granted and those children who are denied such
assistance is the size of the family into which the child permits himself
to be born. 26
The regulation, by providing welfare payments to only the first four
or five dependent children in a family, created a class which is "grossly
underinclusive" 27 upon a consideration that the AFDC program was
initially conceived with the intention and design that all dependent
children (alike) be afforded subsistence benefits. Such underinclusive-
ness, in the words of Justice Marshall, "manifests a prima facie violation
of the equal protection requirement of reasonable classification 28 com-
24. Dandridge at 1163.
25. While needy dependent children in excess of four or five do not receive payments
of any kind, their very existence and presence in the family unit of necessity requires their
shared participation in the enjoyment of the maximum grant allowance. To that extent,
however, the subsistence level of the entire family is thereby reduced proportionately. It
is important to note that for equal protection purposes it is of minor concern whether the
class which is the subject of discrimination is composed of (those) dependent children in
excess of the fourth or fifth or in the alternative, a class composed of individuals from
large families, i.e., those with more than six members.
26. Dandridge at 1179.
27. Marshall also found the Maryland maximum grant regulation to be overinclusive
inasmuch as it applied with equal vigor to a substantial number of people, who, like
appellees, are unable to work. This position was taken in response to the state's
contention that the regulation serves as a viable and logical work incentive for the heads
of AFDC households.
28. See Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav.
341, 348 (1949).
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pelling the state to come forward with a persuasive justification for the
classification., 29
Firm in his conviction that a fundamental constitutional right lay
before the Court 30 Justice Marshall recognized that to public assistance
recipients, AFDC support represents the very sustenance of life, i.e.,
food, shelter and clothing.3' Moreover, he defended the welfare recip-
ient's constitutional right to receive a much needed "gratuitous" benefit
free from arbitrary state manipulation and control.82
Inasmuch as the lower court rested its final determination upon a
constitutional finding, for purposes of this note the author will confine
his analysis and comment to the court's equal protection rationale.
Any discussion of the Equal Protection Clause and its ramifications
would be necessarily inapposite without brief reference to its lan-
guage and history. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States'
Constitution states inter alia that "no state shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ' 3 3 Pursuant to
this congressional edict, courts have consistently upheld the right of an
individual to be free from arbitrary or capricious action on the part of
the state in which he lives.34
Laws that create classifications within the population to which they
apply do not ipso facto run afoul of Equal Protection Clause guarantees.
It is only when legislation is deemed invidious or irrational that the
Constitution is violated.35 If the classification itself be rational, i.e.,
bearing some reasonable relation to the accomplishment of a proper
29. Dandridge at 1179.
30. See note 39.
31. See Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), where the court in
describing the plight of the welfare population said: "Poverty is a bitter enough brew.
It should not be made even less palatable by the addition of unjustifiable inequalities or
discriminations. It must not be forgotten that in most cases public assistance represents
the last resource of those bereft of any alternative, equality . . . should least of all be
denied the poor." Rothstein at 347; see also note 42.
32. On procedural safeguards recognized by the Court in the area of welfare law
generally, see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-342 (1969). (Relying on
devastating impact of wage garnishment to require prior hearings as a matter of due
process); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). On substantive safeguards sde
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 677, (striking down one year residency requirement for
welfare eligibility as violation of equal protection and noting that the benefits in question
are "the very means to subsist-food, shelter and other necessaries of life.")
33. See note 17.
34. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), where the Court used the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to invalidate a wrongful death statute which denied recovery to illegitimate
children but allowed recovery to lawful issue. See also Developments in the Law, Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. Rav. 1082-87 (1969).
35. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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legislative purpose or policy, it will be upheld; 36 providing it applies
with equal vigor to all persons similarly situated. Though an initial
presumption operates in favor of the reasonableness of any legislative
classification,3 7 should the classification be based upon race or color
it will be unconstitutional despite reasons advanced to the contrary.
To be valid such classifications must be necessary, not merely reason-
ably related to the object of the legislation.38
Generally, the Equal Protection Clause requires equality in law
unless the inequality is reasonably justified by the state. In welfare
litigation, each equal protection claim arises in the context of a balanc-
ing test; the Court is essentially concerned with balancing the need
of the individual with the competing needs of the state. To the extent
that the state's interest or need is found to predominate, it may differen-
tiate in the administration of funds allotted for public assistance. Only
when the state's interest reigns supreme will discrimination in the
treatment of welfare recipients be tolerated. Paramount to the deter-
mination of who is to prevail in every equal protection conflict is
the choice of the proper yardstick with which to measure the state's
interest. When a fundamental right confronts the Court, the stan-
dard against which to test the weight of the state's heritage differs
substantially from that applied to a right arising in the regulation of a
business or industrial setting. In the former, to be sustained the state
must show a "compelling interest" as the basis of its discriminatory
treatment.39 In the latter, the state need only demonstrate that a rational
reason exists to practice discrimination. 40 In light of this analysis, the
Court's application of the business standard in Dandridge was clearly
inappropriate. Justice Marshall correctly observed that "appellees are
not a gas company or optical dispenser, they are needy, dependent chil-
dren and families who are discriminated against by the state."' 41 It is
36. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis,
165 U.S. 150 (1896); see Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 28, at 346.
37. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., see note 21.
38. See McLaughlin v. Florida, note 23, where the Court, in striking down a classifica-
tion based upon race, said that the state's burden of justification was much heavier when
race is involved. For a discussion of the weighing of interests and equal protection see also
Tussman and tenBroek, supra, note 28, at 346-53.
39. Shapiro v. Thompson, note 32, at 634; see generally the following cases for a re-
view of the "special scrutiny" doctrine which requires a state to show a compelling inter-
est to justify a discriminatory classification which abridges a fundamental right: Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Parrish v. Civil Service Commission of the County of
Alameda, 425 P. 2d 222 (Cal. 1967); James v. Goldberg, 503 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).40. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Company of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company, see note 21; Ft. Smith Light and Traction
Company v. Paving Dist. No. 16, 274 U.S. 387 (1926).
41. Dandridge at 1184, referring to Lindsley and Lee Optical, see note 40.
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this individual element, not corporate interest, which distinguishes
the two.42
Notwithstanding the Court's failure to expressly acknowledge the
existence of a fundamental right to receive welfare, 43 a number of lower
courts had previously afforded the luxuries of equal protection to pub-
lic assistance recipients. 44 While the Supreme Court has been unable to
resolve this right vis a vis gratuity issue,45 it has properly invoked the
Equal Protection Clause in situations where no rights have in fact
been asserted.46
Assuming arguendo that a welfare recipient possesses the requisite
interest (whether state created or inherent) with which to attack an
arbitrary state statute or regulation, he must first establish the existence
of two elements before equal protection safeguards will attach.47 To be
within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause one must (a) demon-
strate that he is being treated differently from others similarly situ-
ated,48 and (b) establish that the challenged state action is arbitrary
considering the interests of the state and the statutory purpose.
49
It is readily apparent that the application of the Maryland maximum
grant regulation creates two classes of families-those with five or less
dependent children and those with six or more dependent children-
and subjects the larger families to different treatment than the smaller.
The effect of such a classification is to grant or deny AFDC benefits to
needy dependent children solely on the basis of their position in the
family, i.e., numbers one through four or five, receiving full subsistence
42. See Rothstein v. Wyman, note 31, where the court in striking down an amended
section of the New York Social Services Law which provided for reduced welfare pay-
ments to recipients who resided outside New York City said, "the equal protection
standard to be applied to welfare recipients should be stricter than those used upon
review of commercial litigation and more nearly approximate that applied to laws aftect-
ing fundamental constitutional rights." 303 F. Supp. at 347.
43. Welfare assistance does represent a statutory right as distinguished from charity.
If a person meets the requirements prescribed by statute under a federally assisted pro-
gram, the agency is obligated to recognize his claim. See Reich. The New Property, 73
YALE L. J. 733, 785, 786 (1964); 82 HARV. L. REV., supra note 34, at 1192. See also Wilkie
v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1941).
44. Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F.
Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See cases in note 67.
45. For an analysis of the right-privilege distinction, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
46. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
47. See Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 28.
48. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Her-
nandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
49. Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, note 36; see also Levy v. Louisiana, note
34.
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benefits while all others remain unprovided for. In traditional equal
protection terms, the classifications made pursuant to the maximum
grant regulation are underinclusive,50 inasmuch as the benefits actually
awarded are not bestowed upon all eligible dependent children alike,
but only to a select class to the exclusion of all other equally eligible
needy dependent children.5'
Having found that the instant regulation operates to create separate
classes which are to receive dissimilar treatment, some reasonable basis
must exist for the State of Maryland to distinguish between its depen-
dent children.52
The proper subject of the Court's inquiry should now be the exam-
ination of the purposes of the AFDC statutes in relation to the dis-
criminatory classifications created thereunder, en route to the resolution
of the ultimate issue viz., whether or not the classification is rationally
related to either the express or implied statutory purpose. Implicit in
the foregoing statement is the understanding that the basic tenet of
equal protection demands the abolition of all discriminatory classifica-
tions that bear no reasonable and just relation to the purposes of the
act under which they exist.
. The principal purpose of the federal Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children program is to encourage "the care of dependent children
in their homes" and "to furnish financial assistance and other services
. . . to needy, dependent children and the parents or relatives with
50. See 82 H.Auv. L. REv., supra note 34, at 1082-87; Tussman and tenBroek, supra
note 28, at 347-57.
51.- One authority has suggested four arguments which the recipient could raise to
convince the court that the underinclusiveness created by the regulation is unjustified:
1) The interest asserted by the state is not legitimate. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)--state can have no legitimate interest in attempting to regulate or pre-
vent interracial marriages;
2) or even assuming its legitimacy, the state cannot show that the classification ac-
tually serves to achieve that interest. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)-interest
-in regulating morals of mother not served by punishing needy child;
3) or there exists alternative means to accomplish the legitimate interest which
would not result in improper inclusiveness. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966)
-repayment cost of transcript for indigent appellant could easily be made a condi-
tion of probation or parole;
4) or the interest asserted so frustrates the primary purpose of the statute that it
is unreasonable. See Shaprio v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)-that the classification
serves other purposes such as ease of administration does not aid the state when
the consequence of the classification is to defeat the primary purpose of the legisla-
tion.
See comment, Equal Protection as a Measure of Competing Interests in Welfare Litiga-
tion, 21 MAINE L. REv. 175 (1969).
52. The burden of persuasion shifts to the state once it has been shown that the
classification bears no relationship to the primary purpose of the statute. See Green v.
Dept. of Public Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (Del. 1967).
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whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life."5 8
The intent of the Maryland Public Welfare Law is "the strengthening
of family life through services and financial aid.5 4 It is obvious from
even a cursory reading of both the Federal and Maryland Statutes, that
the regulation in question operates to defeat their shared intent inas-
much as it authorizes the refusal of assistance to individual needy
dependent children, which a fortiori places an additional burden on
the entire family unit; given the proposition that when assistance is
terminated with respect to one family member, the family unit as a
whole must of necessity, lower its (own) standard of life accordingly.
In support of the legitimacy of their interest, the state initially ad-
vanced the theory that the instant regulation was essentially a device
to conserve state funds.55 The Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson
has firmly expressed its position with regard to the (constitutional)
impropriety of a state's interest in protecting its treasury saying that:
"the savings of welfare costs cannot be an independent ground for an
invidious classification. '"56 During the post-trial proceedings in the
District Court, the state tendered a four-pronged argument to buttress
its sinking fiscal contention.57 As the first basis for the classifications
born under the regulation, the state alleged its legitimate interest in
encouraging gainful employment among public assistance distributees.
Although the state may admittedly possess a valid interest in providing
an employment incentive to its welfare recipients, as well as owe a
correlative duty to its taxpayers, the AFDC program was designed with
the interest of the needy dependent child in mind and not the conscious
attitude toward employment harbored by the parent. Furthermore, a
statistical survey of Maryland's AFDC families indicates that only a
small percentage of all parents of dependent children are in fact em-
ployable.5s Clearly the employment-incentive to those parents who are
53. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A § 44A et seq. (1969).
55. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. at 454, rev'd 90 S.Ct 1153 (1970).
56. 394 U.S. at 633. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 379 U.S. 254 (1970), decided two weeks
before Dandridge, the Court included ease of administration as well as saving of the
fisc, as a state interest that could not be constitutionally promoted. Id. at 265. Neither
are permissible in the welfare context.
57. Dandridge at 1161.
58. Justice Marshall in his dissent pointed to the District Court's finding that of
Maryland's more than 32,000 AFDC families, only about 116 could be classified as having
employable members. It was left undisclosed the exact or approximate number of parents
included within this total. Also unknown was the number of AFDC families to which
the maximum grant was applicable.
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mentally or physically incapable of working is nonexistent at best.59
Moreover, there is absolutely no basis in reason to believe that parents
of large versus small AFDC families would be inamored with the pros-
pect of employment. To the contrary are results of a recent study which
revealed that a welfare recipient's effort to secure gainful employment
had not been substantially reduced, despite (the receipt of) a guar-
anteed cash assistance from the government. 60
Secondly, the state argues that by the innovation of the maximum
grant regulation, it is seeking to maintain economic equality between
welfare and non-welfare families. Justice Marshall, however, in his
dissenting opinion, disclosed that maximum family grants effective in
other states bear no such relation to the minimum wage.61 In the
absence of cogent evidence offered in behalf of this hypothesis, the state
should be precluded from having a bald assertion on its part raised to
the status of a tenable concept.
Thirdly, Maryland contends that the maximum grant regulation via
its detrimental treatment of large families will provide an incentive
for family planning. Unquestionably the state has a legitimate interest
in making its welfare recipients independent and self-sufficient. 62 It is
equally true that the state should not finance, underwrite or otherwise
encourage the promulgation of large welfare families, whether resulting
from legitimate or illegitimate births.63 Yet since the state does not in
the same vein regulate the morals of persons not receiving welfare, it
would appear that the welfare recipient is being singled out for castiga-
tion on the basis of his impoverished status alone. The situation thus
created by the instant regulation parallels that present before the
Supreme Court in King v. Smith.6 4 There, an Alabama "substitute
father" provision was held invalid which denied AFDC benefits to
children of a mother who cohabited in or outside her home with an
able-bodied man. The lower court observed that although the regula-
tion condemned the moral activity of the mother, the primary punish-
59. It appears that no family members of any of the named plaintiffs in the present
case are employable.
60. Pittsburgh Press, Sept. 24, 1970, at 22, col. 3.
61. The federal minimum wage at the time Dandridge was argued was $52-$64 per
40-hour week, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1964 Ed. Supp. IV). The Maryland minimum wage was
$46-$52 per week. MD. CODE ANN. art. 100 § 83 (1969).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
63. See W. Bell, Aid to Dependent Children 67-75 (1965).
64. See note 12.
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ment was directed toward the child.65 Here, should the state's objective
be perfected, needy dependent children would be severed from state
aid as a result of their parent's failure to obey the state's mandate of
celibacy.
Finally, the state proposes the maximum grant regulation as a
method of allocating public funds so as to best fully meet the needs of
the largest number of families. This is perhaps the most formidable of
all the state's contentions. There can be little doubt that each state has
a clearly defined budgetary boundary with regard to monies available
for distribution to its public assistance recipients." As a practical
matter, the Maryland maximum grant regulation permits individual
family members to receive aid until some stated number of children
after which no money may be received by any additional child. There-
fore, despite the lack of payment to children above a specified number,
the family unit does receive a substantial grant. Were the state to offer
these "extra" children a full grant or even a reduced portion represent-
ing their pro rate share, plain mathematics dictates that many families
with fewer children, whose actual needs exceed that of the maximum
grant, would suffer.
It is important to note that by no means is the concept of a "maxi-
mum grant limitation" a rare avis to the judicial skies. In reaching its
decision the Dandridge Court ostensibly ignored a wealth of recent
precedent which had unanimously found the maximum grant regula-
tion obnoxious to equal protection guarantees.67 Although the grounds
predicated for its validity in Dandridge are new and original, they are
far from persuasive.
A potential basis for argument that the plaintiff-appellees failed to
raise is the obvious analogy which exists between the welfare recipient
and the black man in today's American Society. With the current
oppressive reimbursement plan and its attendant lien provisions, 8 the
65. See Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. at 39.
66. See, Suitable Homes under Social Security: A Functional Approach to Equal
Protection, 70 YALE L. J. 1192 (1962).
67. See Dews v. Henry, 279 F. Supp. 587 (D.C. Ariz. 1969); Westberry v. Fisher, 297
F. Supp. 1109 (D.C. Me. 1969); Lindsey v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 1203 (W.D. Wash. 1969);
Kaiser v. Montgomery, Civil Action No. 49613 (N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969). See also
Collins v. State Board of Social' Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 81 N. W. 2d 4 (1957) (family
maximum invalid under Equal Protection Clause of state constitution); Metcalf v.
Swank, 293 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (dictum).
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A § 76 (1969); see Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.NY.
1968) where sections of the New York Social Services Law, which provided for liens on
real property interests owned by welfare recipients and on potential or actual recoveries
for personal injuries suffered by recipients and for the assignment of interests of insured
recipients in life insurance policies were held neither to offend due process nor violate
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welfare recipient and black man now share the same real, involuntary
and permanent socio-economic disabilities.69 Despite their seemingly
identical status, the welfare recipient has not yet acceded to the same
rights and privileges which his black counter-part enjoys.7 0 It is sub-
mitted that perhaps it is time for the Court to re-assess its position with
regard to the full spectrum of welfare rights and begin moving toward a
genuine program of co-operative federalism for all Americans.
In conclusion, one may only resort to speculation in an attempt to
ascertain why the Court chose Dandridge as the vehicle by which to
wholly abandon the constitutional protection of public assistance recip-
ients. Query whether the Court, with a view to recent swelling of the
welfare ranks71 and the ballooning costs of welfare in general,72 turned
a myopic eye toward the struggling welfare recipient in a subconscious
effort to curb (national) inflation.
Regardless of its motives or intent, the naked reality remains that
the Court by its decision has effectively erased at one fell swoop, years
of continuous progress and achievement in the area of welfare litiga-
tion. By refusing him the equal protection of the laws, the Dandridge
Court has returned the welfare recipient from whence he came-to
his former status as a mere gratuitous donee; one who, in contempla-
tion of law is without standing to question the arbitrariness of his
benefactor's gift.
THOMAS NELSON SILVERMAN
the Equal Protection Clause. See also comment, Snell v. Wyman and the Constitutional
Issues Posed by Welfare Repayment Provisions, 55 VA. L. REv. 177 (1969).
69. Id.; see U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MANPOWER RESEARCH AND TRAINING UNDER THE
MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING AcT 7 (1964) on the creation of a class of persons
who are incurably unemployable; see also Graham, Public Assistance: The Right to
Receive; The Obligation to Repay, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 451 (1968).
70. See notes 23, 38 and 39.
71. Pittsburgh Press, Oct. 1, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
72. Id.
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